YOUTH CITIZENS OBSERVERS NETWORK

The Youth Citizens Observers Network

YCON Sudan

April 2024




A Year Of War in Sudan

YOUTH CITIZENS OBSERVERS NETWORK

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Youth Citizens Observers Network

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About Youth Citizens Observers Network (YCON)

We are a group of Sudanese youth, active in different civil society organizations and resistance committees throughout Sudan, and interested in civilian monitoring and peacebuilding. We formed the Youth Citizens Observers Network (YCON) to support the democratic transition in Sudan by activating the role of youth locally. When the war began in Sudan, the network turned into a platform for monitoring the political, security, and humanitarian situation in Sudan.

The network always seeks to document violations and call for peace and democracy. Through our presence in the field in all Sudanese states, we have been able to compile and issue many periodic and specialized reports, and we always seek to convey the voice of Sudanese youth who reject war and who call for peace in a free, democratic, and just country.

YCON is making every effort to amplify the voice of Sudanese youth as they are a pivotal force on the path to democratic transition and building an inclusive and just society that respects human rights and ensures the general well-being of the Sudanese people.

Our Vision:

Building a transparent social democracy through civilian oversight and strengthening the principle of good governance in Sudan.

Our Mission:

Empowering youth to be the foundation and guarantee for building a democracy that achieves freedom, peace, and justice in Sudan.



Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

On April 15 of this year, the war in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) completed a year. During that time, the war expanded to include more than (10) states in Sudan with different degrees of impact and damage.

The war caused major political division and tension. Many parties from neighboring countries and the region intervened in the Sudanese conflict. The interests of those countries overlapped and greatly influenced the course of the war during the year. Since the beginning of the war, many political parties and civil society organizations have engaged in dialogues and discussions aimed at contributing to ending the war.

Due to factors related to the security tightening in addition to organizational problems in those political alliances, none of these initiatives succeeded in creating a clear vision that turns into tangible action. While regional and international attempts succeeded in bringing the two conflict parties to a dialogue table in the Jeddah Forum, the negotiations achieved little success.

During the war, many youth networks and bodies were active in filling the humanitarian gaps created by the war, effectively filling the voids created by the war. Traditional media coverage was affected by the cessation of radio, television, and newspapers; social media was used to disseminate the speeches of both sides of the war, their supporters, and those who rejected the war outright.

Millions of Sudanese were affected by the war, especially with the displacement and overcrowding in camps for the displaced in the states. Most working people lost their sources of income as a result of the war. Many companies and the government closed and stopped paying workers their wages or disbursing them regularly.

Both parties have committed human rights violations, including: mass murder, physical assassinations, forced disappearances, theft, looting, and sexual violence. The war also caused the demolition of many facilities and houses.

During a year of war, Sudan witnessed the largest displacement crisis in the world. International reports indicate that Sudan may be exposed to a major famine as a result of economic problems and the failure of the agricultural season in many areas affected by the war. This is accompanied by a weak international response to the humanitarian crisis and a lack of responsibility by both sides of the war toward the citizens.



Introduction

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1 Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which began in April 2023, is a complex and multifaceted situation built on a long history of political instability and ethnic tensions resulting from failures in the governance of the Sudanese state. At the heart of the complex conflict lies a power struggle between two rival factions that were part of a coup against the transitional government in October 2021.

1.2 Conflict Roots

The seeds of the current conflict were laid in April 2019 when former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in a popular uprising. In the aftermath, a transitional government was formed to lead Sudan toward a democratic transition. However, this process was derailed in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, staged a military coup, dissolving the transitional government and seizing power.

The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, two powerful military factions, have long been in conflict with each other. Each of them competes to control Sudan's economic resources and enhance their political influence. The Rapid Support Forces, led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, is a paramilitary group that emerged from the Janjaweed militia, a force accused of committing widespread atrocities during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s.

On the other hand, the Sudanese Armed Forces is an institution formed during colonial rule. It has a long history of involvement in Sudan's political affairs. The two groups have clashed on several occasions since the fall of Bashir, but the current 2023 conflict is the culmination of these tensions.

Some of the military tensions that preceded the outbreak of the first spark of war in April 2023 may give an idea of the underlying conflict, as a struggle over economic resources and political influence.

October 2022: The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed in Kassala, eastern Sudan, to control a gold mine. The battles continued for several days and led to dozens of casualties.

November 2022: The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces exchanged heavy fire in the city of El Fasher, North Darfur, due to a dispute over the deployment of the Rapid Support Forces in the region.

December 2022: The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed again in Kassala, this time for control of water well. The fighting resulted in a number of casualties and raised fears of a broader conflict.

February 2023: The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed in Belil locality in South Darfur to control oil fields. The fighting led to a number of casualties and the disruption of oil production in the region.

April 2023: The Rapid Support Forces was deployed in Merowe Airport in northern Sudan, which represented a dangerous turning point in the relationship between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

On April 15 of this year, the Sudan war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces completed a year, in which many military and political transformations were witnessed, resulting in many

negative implications on various aspects, and the lives of Sudanese citizens turned into an unprecedented suffering. During the year, the military operations expanded to include most of the states of Sudan, and only about four states were spared. According to statistics, the number of people killed in the war exceeded fifteen thousand people and numerous violations were committed against citizens, while much of the infrastructure and government facilities were destroyed.

The war left the largest displacement crisis in the world, and the latest report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, dated April 9, 2024, stated that the number of Sudanese who were forced to flee their homes exceeded (8.5) million people, of whom (1.8) million crossed the border outside the country. The war caused social division, while many negative social phenomena spread as a result of displacement and overcrowding in cities. The economy was also negatively affected by the war, with an increase in the unemployment rate as a result of a large number of productions and service sectors suspension of work and the fluctuation in the disbursement of government wages, which caused poor living conditions for citizens. The health sector was also affected by the closure of a large number of hospitals, with a significant shortage of medicine supplies.

This report attempts to shed light on the most important effects of the war during the past year through what was previously published in YCON's periodic reports in addition to the reports of reliable bodies and organizations. The report also attempts to track the opinions of youth and the extent of the war's impact on them through a questionnaire entitled "A Year of War in Sudan" conducted during the period from March 20 to April 6, 2024, with the aim of shedding light on the war in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 15, 2023.

The questionnaire targeted (702) participants, including (472) men (67.2%) and (230) women (32.8%). Among the participants, (405) were from within Sudan (57.7%), in which Blue Nile State recorded the highest participation rate with (74) participants (18.3%), followed by North Darfur State with (69) participants (17.0%). On the other hand, Gezira State recorded the lowest participation rate with five people (1.2%), and was preceded by South Kordofan State, where the number of participants reached eight people (2.0%).

From outside Sudan, the number of participants reached (297) participants (42.3%), and the highest participation rate was recorded in Uganda, which reached (138) participants (43.1%), followed by Egypt with (38) participants (12.8%). The number of participants in the age group between (18) - (25) years was (153) participants (a percentage of 21.8%), while the number of participants in the age group from (26) to (35) years was (355) participants (a percentage of 50.6%). The number of participants in the age group from (36) to (45) years reached (124) participants (17.7%), while the number of participants in the age group over (45) years reached (70) participants (10.0%).

As a result of this war, serious violations of civilian rights emerged, infrastructure was damaged, and the war led to huge economic losses, as it greatly affected more than (71.1%) of respondents. The war also sparked tribal and regional conflicts, led to widespread arming of civilians, and the formation of new armed groups on a tribal basis, especially in the regions of eastern Sudan.



Main Events

A Year Of War in Sudan

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2 Main Events

On April 15, 2023, the war broke out in the city of Khartoum and expanded to some states of Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces were unable to withstand in the states of eastern Sudan, and their forces either dispersed or surrendered, while RSF was able to move from its headquarters in the city of Damazin in Blue Nile to Khartoum. In the states of Kordofan and Darfur, RSF remained around the cities and in their headquarters and then moved to attack the army headquarters, while the force that moved to Meroe in northern Sudan on April 13, 2023, two days before the start of the war, remained in place, before evacuating the airport as a result of the battles with the army. During the year, many military transformations occurred that completely affected the situation, and by tracking YCON's reports during the year, the most important military transformations can be observed in several axes:

2.1 Khartoum and central Sudan

During the first days of the war, the battles were most intense in Khartoum. The Rapid Support Forces deployed in the three cities of the state and took control of many bridges. During the month of June 2023, the battles began to escalate and expand to the southern borders of the state, extending to the states of Gezira and White Nile. In early October 2023, RSF took control of Al 'Aylafun and extended to the entrance eastern Gezira. On December 15, 2023, RSF attacked Gezira and took control on December 18, 2023, then expanded south towards Sennar State and east towards Gedaref State.

2.2 Darfur

The battles began in Nyala in South Darfur after Khartoum, and then continued to include other Darfur states in varying degrees. The Rapid Support Forces began their attack on West Darfur State in May 2023, then

the attacks escalated on June 6, 2023, and the governor of the state, Khamis Abkar, was killed on June 14, 2023. On the 19th of June, RSF captured a Tawila garrison in North Darfur State, then Kass garrison in South Darfur on July 9, 2023. On August 4, 2023, RSF announced their complete seizure of Central Darfur state, and on October 21, 2023, they announced the seizure of the leadership of the 21st infantry division in Zalingei. On October 26, 2023, RSF captured the 16th infantry division in Nyala in South Darfur. On November 2, 2023, the attack on El Geneina in West Darfur was repeated, leading to the seizure of the leadership of the 15th infantry division on November 4, 2023, followed by the 20th infantry division in El Daein in East Darfur.

2.3 Kordofan

Since the start of the war, the Rapid Support Forces spread around the most important cities in Kordofan, such as El-Obeid and Babanusa. RSF has also spread over large areas of Kordofan and attacked the city of El-Obeid several times. Kordofan witnessed military movements from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement SPLM. In June 2023, an attack was launched by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, on the cities of Kadugli and Dilling, while the Rapid Support Forces seized Taiba camp north of Dilling. In July 2023, the SPLM expanded its reach in South Kordofan by seizing Al-Sarfaya and Umm Hattan and closing the Kadugli-Dilling road at Al-Karqal. While the Rapid Support Forces attacked the city of Bara. In October 2023, RSF captured the city of Wadashana, east of Umm Rawaba. In January 2024, it tried to attack the city of Dilling, but the army forces foiled its attempts in partnership with the SPLM.



The Current Division of Controlled Areas

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3 The Current Division of Controlled Areas

The Rapid Support Forces are deployed in (10) states of Sudan. According to the reports of YCON, RSF is in complete control of some states, such as West Darfur, Central Darfur, South Darfur, and East Darfur. In North Darfur, RSF has presence around the city of El Fasher and spread over large areas in the state. In Kordofan region, RSF also spread over large areas, but it does not control any of the capitals of the three states. In North Kordofan, RSF controls all entrances to the city of El Obeid and repeatedly attempts to enter the city.

In the state of West Kordofan, RSF is deployed in large areas, but the cities of Al-Nahud, Al-Fula, and Babanusa are still under the control of the army, while the city of Babanusa is witnessing fierce battles as a result of the RSF's attempt to seize it. In South Kordofan State, RSF is deployed in the northern regions, with extensions in the northern eastern regions of the state. In Khartoum State, RSF is present in its three cities, but more widespread in the city of Khartoum, where they control most of its areas and military headquarters, with the army present in the General Command area and the Armored Camp in Al Shajara, south of Khartoum. In the city of Bahri, RSF is deployed in the eastern Nile region and the northern Bahri regions up to Al-Jili, while the SAF control part of the Al-Kadro and Signal Corps areas.

The army is deployed in a larger area in the city of Omdurman, as after it took control of the radio area, a large area extending from the Al Fatihab to the far north of Omdurman became under the control of the army, while RSF is deployed in the western and southern areas of the city of Omdurman. In the central states of Sudan, RSF is deployed to a large extent in the state of Gezira, which they control, except for Al Manaqil locality, which is controlled by the army. RSF is also deployed to the south from the eastern and western sides, where continuous skirmishes occur within the borders of Sennar State, and some skirmishes have also occurred within the borders of Gedaref State, near the city of Al Faw.



The Conflict Parties and Their Roles

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4.The Conflict Parties and Their Roles

Due to the great complexity of the Sudanese political and social context prior to the war, with that overlapping with the interests of different countries, many parties had an effective role during the war, and local political alliances and their alignments had an important role in determining its course, while many regional and international parties play a pivotal role in the conflict as it is linked directly to their interests in the region.

4.1 Local parties

After the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, the political visions of the civilian and the armed political forces varied and differed as well as their positions. While a number of civilian and armed forces took a neutral position, other forces chose to align with one of the conflicting parties. The forces influencing the conflict can be analyzed through the degree of their proximity or distance from the parties to the conflict, taking into account the fluctuation of positions inherent in the context of war. The forces influencing the conflict can be divided as follows:

4.1.1 Groups Allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF

1) El Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, an Islamic youth group that appeared with the armed forces since the beginning of the war led by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha.

2) The Justice and Equality Movement JEM (Darfur), which had announced its alignment with SAF, and number of its leaders and soldiers appeared in many battlefields, led by Jibril Ibrahim.

3) Sudan Liberation Movement (Darfur), which announced its alignment with SAF and opened a training camp in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, led by Mustafa Tambour.

4) Sudan Liberation Movement (Darfur) led by Minni Arko Minawi.

5) The Sudanese Revolutionary Front SRF, led by Al-Tom Hajo and MOhammad Sayed Al-Jakoumi.

6) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Blue Nile), which participated from the beginning of the war with the armed forces, as its forces were integrated before the war with the armed forces within the security arrangements of the Juba Peace Agreement, led by Malik Agar.

7) The Democratic Alliance for Social Justice, chaired by Ali Askoury and Mubarak Ardol: Although it is a civilian organization that does not have an army, it has been supportive of the armed forces since the beginning of the war, and called on its members to engage in mobilization and popular resistance, but after a year of war, discrepancies appeared within it and calls to review the position. It has split into two parts: a faction led by Ali Askoury calling for continuing the war and supporting the army, and a faction led by Mubarak Ardol calling for reviewing the situation and supporting the negotiation option.

8) Armed movements in eastern Sudan: These are armed movements that have training camps in Eritrea and have declared their support for the army since the beginning of the war, but without actual participation in the fighting or mobilization. The movements are:

- The Beja Conference, led by Musa Mohamed Ahmed (a signatory to the Asmara Peace Agreement and a former assistant to the ousted President Omar al-Bashir).

- The United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice, chaired by El Amin Daoud (East Path).
- The Eastern Sudan Liberation Forces: Newly established after the war and led by Ibrahim Abdallah, known as Ibrahim Dunya.
- The Free Lions, led by Mabrouk Mubarak Slim (a signatory to the East Peace Agreement and a former minister in the government of the National Congress Party).

9) Native Bodies: A group of politically active civil bodies that are most active in eastern Sudan and include:

- The Supreme Council of the Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftaincies, headed by Mohamed Al-Amin Turk, and is supportive of the army and active in the mobilization camps.
- The Supreme Council for Native Administrations, led by the Nazir of the Amara'ar and the Nazir Beni Amer, also announced its support for the army, but is ineffective in mobilization operations.
- Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements Alliance commanded by Shaiba Dirar.

4.1.2 Groups Allied with the Rapid Support Forces RSF

1) Tamazuj announced its forces would join the Rapid Support in August 2023, commanded by Mohamad Ali Qureshi.

2) The United Awakening Front: A group that split from the Revolutionary Awakening Council led by Musa Hilal, and in a statement dated June 27, 2023, announced the formation of the United Awakening Front.

3) Northern Shield Forces, led by Abu Aklah Mohamed Kikel: Since the beginning of the war, he announced his joining the RSF and contributed to its entry and control of the Gezira state.

4.1.3 Groups against the War

1) The Coordination Body of the Democratic and Civil Forces (Tagadom): It consists of about 200 professional, political, and youth bodies that are included under this coalition. Although the main objective of this coalition is to stop the war through a negotiated solution, visions vary greatly among its constituent forces.

2) The Communist Party and the Arab Ba'ath Party: According to their official positions, they stand against the war and call for its stop immediately and accuse the political forces in Tagadom of being biased towards the Rapid Support Forces, as evidenced by signing a political agreement with them.

3) Resistance Committees: No fixed position for the resistance committees was recorder, considering the broad spectrum and its horizontal representation, but some committees clearly declared their support for the army, while members of the resistance committees appeared in the ranks fighting with the army, but most took a position calling for ending the war, and many of the youth joined Emergency Committees, works on providing humanitarian services to those affected by war.

4) Youth revolutionary groups: Some groups, such as "Angry Without Borders", announced their support for the army and celebrating their members who joined the ranks of fighting with the army, but most groups other than this one did not declare clear positions on the war.

5) The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), led by Abdulaziz Adam Al-Hilu: The movement did not declare a position in the war, which the movement's leaders consider - in their dialogues - a war between the remnants of the old regime. However, on the ground and at the beginning of the war, the movement attacked some cities controlled by the armed forces and took control of many sites in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, and then later with threats from The Rapid Support to enter the city of Dilling, it joined the fight against the Rapid Support.

6) Sudan Liberation Movement (Darfur) led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Al Nour: The movement declares a position calling for ending the war by building a large civil front. The movement responded to Tagadom's invitation to a meeting with conditions. Its secretary had met with the Rapid Support Forces Commander, Hemedti in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, in January 2024.

7) Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur) headed by Suleiman Sandal Haqar: It is a movement that split from the parent Justice and Equality Movement, headed by Khalil Ibrahim, in August 2023. The movement had announced after its neutral position and rejectes war. Dispute was due to the emergence of leaks about Sandal's meeting with the second commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Abdelrahim Dagalo, in Chad.

8) The Revolutionary Awakening Council (Darfur), headed by Musa Hilal: At the beginning of the war, Musa Hilal announced his support for the army in a statement, then later showed a neutral position, calling for an end to the war while he was traveling within his tribe's areas in Darfur. In February 2024, reports indicated that an agreement was signed between him and the Rapid Support Forces, which stipulated to compensate him for the damage due to the events in Mustareha in 2017 and permits him to keep his army. According to reports, Musa refused to fight alongside the RSF, preferring to mediate to stop the war. Musa Hilal was the commander of the border guards from which the Janjaweed emerged and developed before turning into the Rapid Support Forces.

9) Beja Congress Party-Collective Leadership (Eastern Sudan) headed by Muhammad Abu Amna: It is a party that stands against the war and takes a neutral position on both sides of it.

4.2 International and Regional Parties and their Roles

The international community can play a decisive role in ending the war in Sudan through several different means, such as mediation and exerting pressure to work towards reaching a peace agreement acceptable to all. It can also provide humanitarian aid to those affected by the war, which helps alleviate suffering, and other means.

Through the questionnaire entitled "A Year of War in Sudan" conducted by YCON, participants were asked to evaluate the role played by the international community in dealing with the war in Sudan.

(29.5%) of the participants expressed their dissatisfaction with the role of the international community, and said that it was not very effective in exerting the necessary pressure on both sides of the conflict to stop the war, while (28.5%) of the participants considered the role of the international community ineffective, and this may be due to the violations that occurred during the humanitarian truces signed by both parties to ensure the safety of civilians, without deterrent punishment for both parties to the conflict from the international community. (20.8%) of the participants indicated that the role of the international community was effective towards the war and on both sides of the conflict. While (11.5%) of the participants took a neutral position towards the role of the international community in the war, and (9.7%) of the participants said that the role of the international community was very effective towards the war in Sudan, which shows their appreciation for the efforts of the international community in pressuring and influencing the conflict in Sudan.

Participants were also asked on what specific actions do participants believe the international community should take to support peacebuilding efforts in Sudan?

(35.0%) of the participants explained that the international community must exert diplomatic pressure on the warring parties in order to stop the war in Sudan, while (27.2%) of the participants believed that the international community must provide more humanitarian aid in order to contribute to alleviating the burdens on those affected and creating a more stable environment in preparation for a permanent cessation of war. (19.3%) of the participants indicated the necessity of deploying

peacekeeping forces in order to stop the war and preserve the lives of civilians, and the reason for this may be due to their despair for the two sides of the conflict to reach a solution to the crisis that could end the war, while (18.6%) of them preferred to impose sanctions on both parties to pressure and encourage them to negotiate and stop the violence. Some participants called for the need to stop the export of weapons from countries supporting both sides of the conflict, impose sanctions on those countries, and ensure criminal accountability for those involved in supporting both sides of the conflict, while others called for ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches the needy and those affected, given that most of the aid goes to the markets.

The regional and international roles had a profound impact on the conflict in Sudan, and their influence cannot be ignored, as the political and armed conflict in Sudan has been extending to neighboring countries.

Countries such as Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central Africa, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, by virtue of their neighborhood with Sudan, had a significant impact on the course of the war since its beginning, and the overlap of the interests of these countries with the Sudanese conflict was a determining factor. The most important regional and international parties that played a role in the war in Sudan war:

1. Egypt

Egypt maintains its strong relationship with the Sudanese army and is almost one of the most influential countries in the Sudanese conflict, given the connection between the strategic issue of the Nile waters and Sudan, in addition to the border and historical proximity that makes it the country most affected by Sudan's conflicts. It has officially demonstrated a desire to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict in Sudan, by hosting many dialogues and initiatives, and receiving many Sudanese political leaders. Despite Egypt's clear support for the Sudanese army, the fear of the

negative implications that a long continuation of the war might have, with the influx of displaced people into Egypt and the loss of control over its southern part, makes its position closer to preferring peaceful solutions, but in a way that puts the army in a stronger negotiating position.

2. Ethiopia

The Ethiopian role participates with Egypt in the interests related to the conflict over the Nile waters, as it is trying to ensure a permanent and influential presence in the Sudanese conflict to prevent Egyptian monopolization of the Sudanese decision. Ethiopia hosted several meetings of Sudanese civil forces supporting an end to the war, and also received Rapid Support Forces Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti" on his foreign visit that followed his long disappearance from public. In addition to the conflict over the Nile waters, Ethiopia has concerns about the expansion and prolongation of the Sudanese conflict, and the resulting instability in the region.

3. Eritrea

Eritrea is interested in the situation in eastern Sudan, and in particular relies on its ally, Musa Mohamed Ahmed, since the Beja Conference in the 1990s. To take into account the social structure, it is also currently interested in Al-Amin Daoud and the new body: the Eastern Sudan Liberation Forces. Although the Eritrean regime enjoys good relations with the native administrations in eastern Sudan, it prefers to deal with political bodies and figures. It was noted that during this war, Eritrea hosted training camps for a number of movements related to eastern Sudan, and also received a number of political leaders supporting the armed forces.

4. Libya

Libya also had a clear role in the Sudanese conflict. Although it adopted an official position in support of the Sudanese state and its sovereignty, it received Al-Burhan in February 2023 and then received Hemedti

afterwards and put forward what resembled an initiative for a political solution that however did not receive a response. Libya's importance comes from the shared border that is open to large areas which are not controlled by the government and opens the door wide to the smuggling of weapons and fuel, and the movement of soldiers between the two countries, especially since Hemedti has close relations with Khalifa Haftar.

5. Republic of Chad

It is one of the most important countries influencing the conflict in Sudan, given the long border line linking it to Sudan, which is located in an area of tribal overlap in which Muhammad Hamdan's tribe moves. At the beginning of the war, Chad announced the closure of its borders with Sudan and adopted a position closer to that of the army, but later the Chadian position appeared to change, and some reports showed that its borders were being used to bring weapons into Sudan for the benefit of the Rapid Support Forces.

6. South Sudan

The role of South Sudan in the conflict depends on many considerations. In addition to the historical ones, the economic relationship between Sudan and South Sudan linked to oil transportation lines makes South Sudan have a great interest in stabilizing the situation in Sudan, and this is what made it keen to host both sides of the conflict and the various political groups and to mediate between them. In addition, the long border line, most of which is located in the RSF-controlled areas, made South Sudan adopt a position closer to neutrality between the two parties to the conflict.

7. Saudi Arabia

Since the beginning of the war, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played an important role in attempts to bridging the gaps in views between the warring parties. The first negotiation sessions were hosted in Jeddah

under Saudi-American sponsorship. Saudi Arabia's interest in the war in Sudan comes due to the presence of a large number of Sudanese fighters in the state of Yemen fighting the Saudi war against the Houthis, and the conflict over the Red Sea may also have played a role in Saudi Arabia's interest in the Sudanese matter.

8. United Arab Emirates

The UAE has an influential role in the war in Sudan, and its role - according to reports - is almost the largest. Many discrepancies emerged regarding that role, through statements by military leaders from the armed forces, but the first official Sudanese statement against the UAE was issued by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations on March 29, 2024, and it said in a letter submitted to the UN Security Council what it called "the Rapid Support Forces' aggression against the Sudanese army" was planned and supported by the UAE and with the assistance of Chad.

In December 2023, the Sudanese authorities announced that 15 diplomats from the UAE Embassy in Sudan were persona non grata and instructed them to leave the country within 48 hours. On November 28, 2023, a member of the Sovereign Council and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Yasser Al-Atta, publicly accused Abu Dhabi of siding with the Rapid Support Forces in its war against the Sudanese army.

The UAE officially denies its interference in Sudan, although numerous reports link it to the supply of weapons that reach the RSF through a number of neighboring countries. The Emirati position raises great discontent within Sudan, and a report published by YCON in December 2023 stated that citizens of the city of Port Sudan in the Red Sea in eastern Sudan carried out a protest, demanding the expulsion of the Emirati ambassador from Sudan. It is believed that the UAE's intervention in Sudan is related to the conflict over the Sudanese ports.

9. United States of America

Since the beginning of the conflict, USA has shown great interest and has exerted great pressure to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis. It has participated with Saudi Arabia in facilitating the peace negotiations that were held in Jeddah. In addition to that, it has exerted a great pressure on both parties to the conflict by the imposition of sanctions.

10. Russia

Russia's position on the war in Sudan is linked to its struggle for presence in the Red Sea, in addition to its interests in the extraction of gold from Sudan through its relationship with the Rapid Support Forces. Russia does not intervene directly in the conflict, but reports confirm the presence of Wagner in Sudan, in addition to their participation in the fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces since the beginning of the war.

11. Ukraine

Although Ukraine did not have major political interests in Sudan prior to the war, reports indicated the participation of Ukrainian forces in the fighting in Khartoum. The CNN news broadcast a video report on September 20, 2023, on the participation of Ukrainian forces in the war in Khartoum. Video clips also showed Ukrainian forces targeting Rapid Support Forces vehicles, and reports indicate that Ukrainian forces are fighting "Wagner" on the fields.



Local Political Initiatives to Ending the War

A Year Of War in Sudan

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5 Local Political Initiatives to Ending the War

Since the beginning of the war, many political parties and civil society organizations have engaged in dialogues and discussions aimed at contributing to stopping the war, but none of these initiatives succeeded in creating a clear vision that translates into tangible action. The restrictions on political actors and activists on the ground may be one of the factors behind the delay in anti-war action, but factors related to the nature of political alliances, their objectives, and their working mechanisms are also very important.

Most political initiatives to resolve the crisis were unable to escape charges of bias towards one of the parties to the conflict. During a year of the war, many initiatives and proposals calling for ending the war were published, but the Coordination Body of the Democratic and Civil Forces "Tagadom" was the most prominent, as members of this coalition were part of the alliance ruling during the transitional period. "Tagadom" initiative was unable to achieve any progress even after signing a declaration with the Rapid Support Forces that failed to achieve tangible results on the ground. It has also failed to convince the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces to accept to attend a meeting, which weakened its political influence in the negotiation process and thwarted its attempts to achieve peace.

In the questionnaire conducted by YCON entitled "A Year of War in Sudan", participants were asked: "To what extent are you aware of the various political initiatives aimed at ending the war in Sudan?"

(43.9%) of participants responded that they are very aware of the various political initiatives aimed at ending the war in Sudan, and this percentage shows their deep interest, political awareness, and good knowledge of the

current situation in the country. (39.6%) of the participants claimed that they are aware of the initiatives taken to stop the war, and this also shows their interest in the political situation and peace in Sudan, but they may be less familiar with the details related to the initiatives. However, a small percentage of (11.5%) stated that it is not aware of these initiatives, perhaps due to lack of awareness or lack of interest in political affairs in the country in general, while (5.0%) admitted that they are not aware at all of the political initiatives aimed at ending the war, and they are generally not interested in political and humanitarian affairs in Sudan.

Regarding the extent of participants' confidence in the effectiveness of these political initiatives in achieving sustainable peace, the results were a mixture of confidence and doubt in the effectiveness of political initiatives related to stopping the war and achieving peace in Sudan, which shows the different challenges faced by the participants. (29.6%) of the participants expressed their confidence "to some extent" in these initiatives, and this stems from their belief in the importance of a political solution to stop the war and achieve peace, but they may have some reservations or doubts about the effectiveness of these initiatives. While (22.8%) of the participants responded that they lack confidence "to some extent" in the current political initiatives, and this may be due to errors in implementing these initiatives or a lack of transparency or confidence in the entities responsible for them. (18.5%) of the participants chose a neutral position towards these initiatives.

This may be due to not obtaining sufficient information or relying on a neutral point of view. On the other hand, (17.1%) of the participants feel great confidence in these initiatives, and their belief is strong in the ability of these initiatives to achieve progress towards peace and end conflicts, while (12.0%) of them feel no confidence at all in these organizations, and this may be due to negative previous experiences, or they are not convinced by the methods used.

Participants were also asked about **their greatest concerns about the current political initiatives to end the war,** and the answers included many concerns, some of which are related to governance form after the war, while others are related to the political vision of the parties. Some of the participants expressed the situation in brief terms (failure - I have no fears - the continuation of the war - lack of agreement).

Concerns regarding the form of governance are summarized as follows:

- Tribal and regional bias further fuels the war and expands its scope.
- Failure to acknowledge historical non-success by the political and military elites that have ruled the country since independence until today.
- Failure to find a radical solution to the war, a bad reproduction of tyranny, or lead to the army's participation in power.
- Political consensus not to be reached to achieve gains regarding civil rule.
- Reaching an agreement without referring to the real stakeholders or the primary affected people.
- Reaching a political agreement that is unfair to the victims.
- Party quotas and personal interests.
- Concerns are not about the initiatives themselves, but rather about the lack of commitment to implementing what was agreed upon.
- Failure of all parties to adhere and the lack of a strong will to stop the war.
- Intense polarization and media calling for the continuation of the war.
- Most of the initiatives are presented by countries that have interests in Sudan, while the initiators' concern must be the country first.

The concerns related to political visions and parties are summarized as follows:

- Lack of unified visions aimed at ending the war and those regarding political solutions.
- Aligning with one of the warring parties.
- Searching for more political ambitions than aiming at ending the war.
- Lack of inclusiveness and weak participation of youth, women, and marginalized groups of displaced persons and refugees.
- Competitiveness among initiative leaders.
- Party divisions that lead to disagreement on the form and type of governance in Sudan.
- The divisions, the multiplicity of initiatives and their different objectives contribute to deepening the crisis and closing the way to the proposed solutions.
- Inability to find a solution to the current crisis.
- Lack of involvement of actors from local communities.
- It responds to the needs of the international community while it leaves out the needs of Sudanese citizens.
- Reproducing the scene of the transitional period in partnership with the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces and returning to the cycle of the military coup.
- Through the experience of the current revolution and war, most members may not be qualified to manage the political scene.
- Civilians do not currently have the authority or power to enforce a lasting peace.
- It is not neutral, which makes it untrustworthy to the Sudanese, who fear that these initiatives will bring criminals and perpetrators from both sides back to the forefront through a political agreement.
- It does not communicate well with the effective people inside Sudan, and it is not known to stakeholders on the ground, and this may make it unacceptable to some groups, which makes its work difficult.



Negotiations Paths

A Year Of War in Sudan

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6 Negotiations Paths

After the start of the war on April 15, 2023, many attempts were made by a number of countries to mediate between the two warring parties, starting with truces and then ceasefire agreements, most of which failed due to weak will, the absence of clear monitoring mechanisms, and the lack of trust between the two parties to the conflict. YCON's truce monitoring reports indicated many violations by both sides of the conflict.

The US and Saudi mediation interventions resulted in both parties agreeing to meeting for negotiations in the 'Jeddah Platform', which started on May 6, 2023, and focused on:

- Achieving a short-term ceasefire.
- Facilitating humanitarian aid access to those in need and restoring basic services.
- Preparing a timetable for ceasefire negotiations for a permanent ceasefire.

The negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement of principles called the Jeddah Declaration for the Protection of Civilians of Sudan on May 11, 2023. Among its most important provisions were to enable the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, the withdrawal of forces from hospitals and clinics, and the burial of the dead. The two parties signed a short-term ceasefire agreement, however; did not adhere to it. The second round of negotiations began on May 14, 2023, to discuss new details, but it did not continue, as the army delegation withdrew from the negotiation on the pretext that the Rapid Support Forces did not adhere to what was agreed upon. Following that, IGAD called for a summit on July 10, 2023, in which both parties to the conflict would participate, but the government

party refused to participate in the opening session, rejected the outcomes of the session, and denounced the call for the introduction of external forces to protect civilians, according to what the participants in the IGAD summit hinted at.

On June 15, 2023, the army delegation returned to Jeddah to resume negotiations. On July 2, 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America announced the suspension of negotiations as a result of serious violations of attempts at calm. The two countries accused both parties to the conflict of claiming to represent the interests of the Sudanese people, but their actions increased their suffering and endangered national unity and regional stability.

The third round of negotiations resumed in on October 25, 2023, with the participation of IGAD and the African Union in the team of facilitators, along with KSA and the US, but the two parties were unable to reach an agreement on a ceasefire.

In December 2023, an emergency IGAD summit was held for the purpose of discussing the situation in Sudan, but the Sudanese government rejected the summit's outcomes, which included a proposal for a meeting between the two commanders of the SAF and RSF. Later, on January 20, 2023, the Sudanese government announced the freezing of its membership in IGAD in protest against the organization's failure to adhere to Sudan's decision to freeze engagement with IGAD in any activity related to Sudan.

The course of the negotiations shows the lack of seriousness of the two parties and their weak desire to reach a peaceful solution to end the war. While the government party insists, through its leaders' statements, on continuing the military solution and protesting most of the regional and


international negotiating initiatives, the behavior of the Rapid Support Forces on the ground is a clear expression of prioritizing military solutions over peaceful ones, especially since their forces attack safe villages and cities, contrary to repeated statements from its leaders on the desire to stop the war.

In the questionnaire conducted by YCON entitled "A Year of War in Sudan", participants were asked what actions they would like to see from the Sudanese government and other stakeholders to peacefully resolve the conflict.

Some opinions showed a complete rejection of government solutions, without recognizing or giving them any legitimacy, while others made suggestions about what should be done:

- The principle of general amnesty must be used and those involved in human rights violations must be held accountable.
- Ceasefire and pave the way for civil forces to rearrange the scene.
- Addressing the roots of the problem and looking at the war within the framework of comprehensive solutions and not treating it as a war between the SAF and the RSF.
- Demonstrating a firm desire to end the war.
- Agreement on a ceasefire and hostilities, and the protection of civilians.
- Ending the rebellion and returning life to normal.
- Ceasefire and facilitating food aid to all regions.
- Arrange to sit on the negotiations table immediately.
- Achieving security, peace, and balanced, lasting and just development.

- Raising the importance of civil society in the transitional arrangements to reach a civilian, non-partisan transitional government that does not include the remnants of the previous regime.
- Dialogues in which broad sectors of Sudanese society participate.
- Ceasefire and opening safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- Forming a civil bloc united around a civil state and government and the issues of building a national army, far from political and ideological affiliations.
- Work to collect all weapons from armed people and secure the state, giving those who took up arms an alternative way to build a good life for themselves, and bringing warmongers to justice.
- Forming a broad civil front and working to build a comprehensive dialogue to stop the war.
- Responding to the initiatives of active political and civil forces.
- Full commitment to the outcomes of agreements and initiatives seeking to resolve the crisis.
- Sitting with civil forces that believe in civil transformation, accepting negotiation, and unifying initiatives.
- Involving youth in initiatives to develop solutions to end the war and in future political arrangements.



The Role of Youth during the War

A Year Of War in Sudan

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7 The Role of Youth during the War

After the outbreak of the December 2018 revolution, an active participation of youth was witnessed in the public sphere in addition to their great influence in events through many youth organizations and networks that were formed during the revolution and were able to benefit from technology and employ it in order to advance the issues that concern them. Resistance Committees were formed, followed by Service and Change Committees, which were most influencing in the period following the revolution due to their widespread and organization. The youth group is the most affected by the outbreak of the April 15 war, as universities, schools, and companies have closed, and most of the soldiers and fighters are from this group, while it is targeted for mobilization.

On the other hand, many networks and youth bodies were active in filling the humanitarian gaps created by the war, in addition to many other effective contributions. **The questionnaire conducted by the YCON showed the effective contribution of young people during the war period, through their answers to a question about the roles they play or played during it. The most important roles mentioned by the participants were:**

- Raising awareness of the implications of civil war and assisting expatriates who were displaced from their homes and lined up in displacement camps and shelter centers.
- Working to unify the voice of the Sudanese under the umbrella of stopping the war and building a state of citizenship.
- Working with the Sudanese people to stop the war and put pressure on the parties to open humanitarian corridors to bring in humanitarian aid and other necessities, followed by holding a dialogue between Sudanese people, the most important of which is

to remove the military from politics in order to build a state of equal citizenship and the rule of law after bringing all those wanted to the International Criminal Court and everyone involved in the April 15 war to fair trials, whether national, regional or international.

- Exposing violations to the international community, supporting initiatives that encourage peaceful coexistence, recognizing state institutions and working to reconcile their situation.
- Work to spread a culture of social peace and provide humanitarian aid.
- Supporting work on comprehensive political participation in ending the war and unifying youth platforms and initiatives.
- Strengthening youth organizations and networks and working to network them with other civil forces and political parties.
- Organizing advocacy campaigns that highlight the situation in Sudan within international and regional forums and conferences.
- Work to educate society about the dangers of arming and fighting battles that may lead to the complete destruction of Sudan.
- Work to curb hate speech and educate Sudanese refugees on issues of rights and cultural and social integration.
- Promoting societal peace issues to the priorities of the government and civil society, helping to understand the roots of political and societal conflicts, contributing to finding effective solutions to them, and raising professional and scientific standards in approaching economic, developmental and cultural problems.
- Spreading the culture of peacebuilding and conflict resolution through specialized workshops for active citizens, especially young people, and enhancing the concept of patriotism through intensive training for primary and secondary school students through projects dedicated to this purpose.
- Supporting peace and disseminating information related to national initiatives to stop the war so it reaches citizens and the public.

- Working and thinking about different ways together with actors to stop the war and establish a democratic civil transformation.
- Documenting violations by warring parties to ensure that justice will be achieved and that the rights of victims will not be lost.
- Spreading awareness of human rights, the culture of democracy and peace, and adopting an approach of non-violence and peaceful resistance.
- Work to stop the war first, then address the roots of the Sudanese problem and develop solutions to it through conferences to establish a lasting peace, and then work together to build the nation by giving priority to the country's best interest.
- Engage in community initiatives to enhance social cohesion and not return to the tribe.
- Reducing hate speech, promoting social peace, addressing historical injustices, achieving justice, reducing violations, and providing humanitarian aid; In addition to political roles that include contributing to the formation of a national political vision in which citizenship is the basis of rights and duties.

The results of the questionnaire showed that (32.6%) of the respondents participated in awareness-raising activities aimed at providing support to those affected by the war by volunteering with Sudanese civil society organizations. (25.7%) of respondents indicated that participants shared reliable information on various social media platforms in order to spread awareness and combat misinformation.

The results of the questionnaire also showed that (16.1%) of the participants donated to humanitarian organizations that provide services to those affected by the war, including displaced people in shelters. (16.1%) of the respondents stated that they participated in initiatives calling for ending the war, while (9.4%) of the respondents indicated their

participation in protests and demonstrations calling for stopping the war, which shows their insistence on expressing their rejection of the violence and the ongoing conflict between SAF and RSF. Some of them also participated in documenting violations and cases of sexual violence against women, indicating their support for justice and human rights and their solidarity with the victims.

Regarding the extent of the importance of the participation of Sudanese youth abroad in supporting peace-building efforts in Sudan, 82.2% of respondents considered the participation of youth abroad to be very important in supporting peace-building efforts in Sudan, and this opinion confirms the belief in the strength of their role and their effectiveness in achieving peace and stability in the country, especially with the high proportion of youth in Sudan. (11.4%) believed that youth participation abroad is somewhat important, while (2.7%) of respondents took a neutral position regarding youth participation abroad. The remaining (1.7%) said that the participation of youth abroad in supporting peacebuilding efforts is not important, which shows an underestimation of the importance of the role of young people in this context, while (2.0%) of the respondents said that the participation of youth abroad is not important at all, in which it ignores the role that can be played by youth in supporting peacebuilding efforts in Sudan.

What type of support is most beneficial for Sudanese youth abroad to participate in changing the situation in Sudan? (30.1%) of the participants believed that training and providing the necessary resources to provide awareness and raise money for humanitarian aid would be the most beneficial support for them, as they believe in the importance of empowering youth with knowledge and necessary skills to contribute to various fields. (26.8%) of participants also stressed the need to enable youth to access accurate and reliable information, to ensure that they obtain the necessary knowledge to understand the situation and participate effectively in peacebuilding efforts. (22.1%) of the participants stated that they believe that youth should be empowered by organizing

protests around the world and demanding an end to the war. This confirms the importance of the role of youth in expressing their rejection of violence and conflict and exerting pressure on both sides through peaceful means. While (20.9%) of the participants indicated the need to support the mental and psychological health of youth, pay attention to the personal, emotional and psychological aspects of the individual and support them in dealing with the challenges of war and conflict. Some youth saw the importance of personal change and working for self-development, which is a first step towards building a diverse society that is tolerant of its cultural, tribal and religious differences.

Role of Media Coverage in the War in Sudan

A Year Of War in Sudan

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
8 Role of Media Coverage in the War in Sudan

Media coverage played an important role during the war, and the positions of regional countries on the conflict affected channels' coverage. The multiplicity of violent conflicts in the world during the past year also affected media coverage of the war in Sudan. Social media was active during the war, and both warring parties and their supporters used their pages on platforms to spread hate speech, disinformation campaigns, and misleading news. On the other hand, a large number of youth who rejected the war used these platforms to spread discourse in support of peace. The survey conducted by YCON showed that (34.8%) of the participants follow the events constantly and accurately through various social media platforms. This may be due to the fact that they have become an integral part of people's lives, even though they are not considered official channels for accurate and reliable news. (26.4%) of the participants stated that family and friends keep them informed of developments in Sudan or areas witnessing ongoing unrest, while (20.3%) of the participants said that they rely on reports from humanitarian organizations that have a high degree of reliability. As for (18.6%) of the participants, they indicated that news channels keep them informed of events in Sudan.

Regarding the reliability of the information about the war, (41.2%) of the participants explained that the news they receive about the situation in Sudan is reliable to some extent. This means that they believe that the news contains some reliable information to some extent but still needs verification, while (22.2%) of the participants expressed a significant weakness in their confidence in the news to some extent and its accuracy and reliability. (15.8%) of the participants took a neutral position regarding the reliability of the news. (12.8%) of participants felt that the news is very reliable, which shows their great confidence in the news sources they receive. As for (8.0%) of the participants, they indicated that they do not trust the news at all.

As for the biggest challenges that participants in the questionnaire face in accessing reliable information about the war, (43.7%) of the participants indicated that misinformation and fake news are among the biggest challenges they face in accessing reliable information about the war. (32.6%) of the participants stated that poor and limited access to the Internet represents a major obstacle to verifying the credibility of information received, while (3.6%) believed that language barriers have a major impact on receiving reliable information about the war. Some participants indicated that the news they receive on social media is conflicting compared to the news they receive from relatives in affected areas, making it more difficult to determine the credibility of the information. Some participants believe that the control of both parties to the conflict over many platforms and individuals, including journalists, has led to the systematic broadcast of false and misleading news, which has affected the credibility of the news they receive, as shown in the figure below.

Challenges Faced by Participants in Accessing Relevant Information about the War



On the other hand, the participants were asked about the extent of their satisfaction with the level of global media attention to the war in Sudan, and (46.4%) of the participants expressed their dissatisfaction at all with the global media attention to the war currently taking place in Sudan, while (33.3%) of the participants expressed their dissatisfaction with They are somewhat satisfied with the media attention to the Sudan war, and the reason is the level of coverage or the quality of the information provided. Some view media coverage as insufficient or inaccurate, raising concerns that humanitarian issues and violations in Sudan are being ignored. (10.3%) of the participants took a neutral position regarding the role of international media in covering the war in Sudan. While (7.3%) of the participants expressed their satisfaction to some extent with the role of the international media in covering the war in Sudan, while a very small group, amounting to (2.7%) of the participants, expressed their complete satisfaction with the role of the international media in shedding light on the war in Sudan.



Implications of the War

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9 Implications of the War

The war affected very many aspects of the lives of Sudanese. Socially, cases of displacement, overcrowding in camps, and tension and tribal division had a great impact on people's lives, in addition to the devastating influence on the economy by increasing rates of unemployment and poverty, in addition to its great implication on the state of security and safety, and the freedom of expression and movement.


The survey conducted by YCON showed that (71.1%) of Sudanese were greatly affected by the war on a personal level, while (23.4%) of people were affected to a great degree, (3.7%) of them were affected to a moderate degree, and (1.6%) %) to a small degree. A very small percentage (0.3%) stated that they were not affected by the war at all.

Regarding the ways in which the war affected the participants, the results showed the multiple effects of the war on civilians, as (26.5%) of the respondents were affected by the war economically and most of them lost various sources of income, which leads to the deterioration of the financial situation of individuals and families, and its direct impact was evident. In Sudan's economy, the prices of food commodities and house rents rose. (25.6%) of the participants were displaced from their homes to other safer places, for various reasons, including forced displacement, as happened in states witnessing clashes between SAF and the RSF, and some of them were subjected to genocide and ethnic cleansing, as happened in the city of El Geneina in West Darfur state. RSF targeted non-Arab tribes, and the governor of the state, Khamis Abdullah Abkar, who was from Masalit tribe, was brutally killed by RSF.

(24.3%) of the participants expressed their feelings of distress and emotional pain as a result of separation from their family, as many

individuals suffer from psychological disorders such as anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorders as a result of their difficult experiences during the war, and they carry the truama of violence, fear, and psychological pressure all the time. (23.6%) of the participants indicated the difficulty of communicating with family inside Sudan as a result of poor network and sometimes interruption in many areas that witness ongoing clashes.

The figure below shows the ways in which participants' lives are affected by war:



In answer to the question "How did the war affect your sense of belonging to the Sudanese society?", (36.6%) of the participants said the current war has increased their sense of belonging to the Sudanese society, and this may be due to the current circumstances they are facing that might strengthen their sense of belonging. (26.5%) of the participants indicated that their sense of belonging to Sudanese society had not changed, while (16.4%) of the participants reported that their sense of belonging had decreased significantly. It appears that the war and its effects and the various violations that accompanied it led to a weakening of the sense of belonging to Sudanese society. A percentage of (12.8%) of

the participants expressed their weak sense of belonging to Sudanese society after the war, while the war had little effect on (7.7%) of the participants. By tracking the YCON reports published during the year, it is possible to extract a number of the effects that the war had on several levels.

9.1 Social Dimensions and Intersections of War

- **Kordofan Region**

Social intersections greatly affect the conflict in Kordofan, as a large number of RSF soldiers are from areas in the state, especially South and West Kordofan, and tribal conflicts intersecting with the armed conflict in South Kordofan also cast a shadow on the war. In South Kordofan, social dimensions of the war appear related to the social and tribal conflict between Hawazma and Misseriya tribes on the one hand and the Nuba tribes on the other, which is a conflict that can be traced historically over land and pastures. Prior to the war, the region witnessed a conflict in the Laqawa region, which resulted in the displacement of large numbers of Nuba tribes from their areas.

These conflicts intersect with the already existing political and military conflict between the SAF and SPLM-N (Al-Hilu's faction), which controls large areas of South Kordofan. The state is witnessing overlapping confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the army on one side and between the former and the SPLM forces on the other side, with armed confrontations continuing between the armed forces and the SPLA. The tribal dimension appears in the alignment that took place in the city of Dilling, where reports circulated that the forces of SPLM-N (Al-Hilu's faction) fought with SAF, most of whose members are Nuba.

In the state of West Kordofan, the war takes on a tribal competitive nature between the Misseriya tribe and Hamar, and its signs appeared prior to the war due to land disputes. In this war, the leaders of Hamar tribe showed

rejection to the temptations of the RSF to joining efforts, and the region also witnessed extensive tribal armament and military preparation for the battle prior to the war. There is also an armed tribal group called Abu Jubba Army in Hamar areas.

- **Blue Nile Region**

Influenced by the effectiveness of Abu Shotal Mek in the RSF, Hamaj and Funj tribes support the RSF, and the presence of the prominent leader of the RSF, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Rahman Al-Bishi, also represents a strong motivation for the Arab tribes in the Blue Nile (Kenana and Rifa'a). On the other hand, we find Anqasna tribes closer to the army as they are influenced by the presence of Malik Agar in power as deputy to the Sovereignty Council and the participation of his forces in the ongoing war alongside SAF. In addition to that, they are influenced by the remnants of the tribal war that took place two years ago between Hausa, Hamj and Funj tribes, the Hausa groups are adopting a position closer to the army, while the masses of SPLM-N(Al-Hilu faction) are neutral.

- **Darfur Region**

The tribal and social aspect of the conflict in Darfur can easily be traced. In West Darfur, which was controlled by the RSF, the nature of the conflict was tribal, in which a large number of citizens from Masalit tribe were killed, and that led to the emergence of tribal calls in the displacement camps in Chad to carry arm against the RSF, as well as in the states of eastern Sudan where there is Masalit concentration. While the areas with a tribal influence belonging to RSF in South Darfur and East Darfur are witnessing an overall calm.

In the North Darfur region, the armed movements are in control, the majority of which are from Zaghawa tribe, which competes in power with Rizeigat, and the conflict extends beyond the Sudanese borders, as the battles for El Fasher (the capital of North Darfur) may affect the political

conflict in Chad, given the extension of the two tribes between the two countries and their participation in the struggle for power. In some areas in Darfur, native administrations announced their complete bias towards the RSF, but the head of Rizeigat tribe, Madibo, did not declare that openly, but rather showed a moderate position.

- **Eastern Sudan Region**

The war is taking its toll on eastern Sudan and is affected by the social conflict that already existed prior to the war. Although a number of armed movements were active in recruitment and training amid the war, it is noted that they did not participate directly in mobilization, even with their position in support of the SAF, while tribal bodies of a political nature, such as: The Supreme Council of the Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftaincies, headed by Mohamed Al-Amin Turk, The Supreme Council for Native Administrations, led by the Nazir of the Amara'ar and the Nazir Beni Amer, and Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements Alliance commanded by Shaiba Dirar, who appears accompanied by armed men inside the city of Port Sudan, announced their support for the army, but Nazir Turk appears to be more active and involved in the mobilization operations.

Eritrea has interests in the situation in eastern Sudan and relies in particular on its ally since the days of the Beja Conference, Musa Muhammad Ahmed. Taking into account the social structure in the east, it is now also interested in El Amin Daoud and the new body (The United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice). Although the Eritrean regime enjoys good relations with the symbols of native administrations in eastern Sudan, it prefers to deal with political bodies and figures.

- **The Northern and Central Regions**

At the social level, the call for mobilization has gained wide popularity, and RSF has become an existential threat for the northern and central communities, especially in the Nile and Northern states with the

mobilization of almost the entire society to the point that prevents any activity opposing the war. Gezira State was less affected by the mobilization against RSF, but after their widespread violations against civilians following its invasion of the state, polarization against RSF became to the same degree in the North and the Nile River. The social structure in the states of White Nile and Sennar is similar, and the communities take a position similar to that of Gezira, especially with the arrival of RSF to the borders of the two states and its occupation of some villages and small towns, where same accusations of committing violations against civilians are repeated, and created a public opinion against RSF in the two states.

9.2 The Implications of War on Social Conditions

The war had major social implications during its year. By tracking YCON reports published, it is noted that cases of displacement and overcrowding, loss of sources of income, and long waiting have left major psychological effects on most Sudanese, with frustration being widespread. With the increase in unemployment, many negative phenomena spread, such as theft and drug trade. An increase in cases of sexual exploitation was also observed during the war in safe cities. During the year, YCON's observers noted an increase in family disintegration rates as a result of the separation of families and the loss of sources of income. The war generally caused an increase in crime rates in all regions of Sudan, as cases of theft, banditry, and the exchange of contraband increased.

The tension and polarization caused the emergence of many forms of war discourses with social dimensions, which led to the targeting of tribal elements loyal to one of the war parties. Many groups were also targeted with hate speech, such as tea sellers and small shops owners, who grew in numbers during the war. When RSF entered Madani, social networks circulated accusations against Al Kanabi residents of facilitating their entry into the city. The war led to many social and tribal divisions. The

states of Darfur and Kordofan witnessed forms of conflicts and tribal alignments, and forms of social division appear in Blue Nile State.

During one year of the war, social and entertainment activities decreased, especially in areas under the control of RSF, with activity in marriage cases by RSF soldiers. Some organizations in areas under army control are trying to organize social activities targeting the displaced, and youth have also been organizing sports events. However, the closure of schools resulted in the spread of children in markets and increased rates of child labor and child crimes. Many neighborhoods have resorted to models of local solidarity programs through charitable giving, which are popularly supported by affluent people and volunteers.

9.3 The Impact of War on Human Rights Conditions and the Protection of Civilians

During the course of one year of war, many violations were witnessed. The Rapid Support Forces, which are now deployed across large areas of Sudan after April 15, 2023, committed many violations that amounted to what can be described as war crimes and crimes against humanity, including: ethnic cleansing and forced displacement. Sudanese Armed Forces committed a large number of violations through unguided bombing of populated areas, arbitrary arrests, and restrictions on freedoms. It can be noted that the severity of the violations was proportional to the intensity of the battles. Khartoum State witnessed many violations at the beginning of the war, including attacks on public facilities, thefts, arbitrary arrests, inhumane treatment of prisoners and detainees, and undirected air and artillery strikes in residential areas. Then, as the battles intensified, the violations spread to other states of Sudan, most notably in West Darfur State, in which the Rapid Support Forces and their militias attacked citizens and committed large massacres, which was repeated in Gezira state when RSF entered it in December 2023.

Many complaints about cases of sexual abuse were repeated during the war, and the YCON's reports recorded many cases of sexual abuse during the year in the states of Khartoum, Kordofan and Gezira. The violations that occurred during the war can be classified as follows:

9.3.1 Mass murder

During the war, many mass murders were committed, most notably the murders that occurred in the city of El Geneina, in which the RSF's attacks began on April 24, 2023. RSF slaughtered a large number of citizens from Masalit tribe, leaving behind thousands of bodies scattered in the streets, in addition to the retaliatory operations carried out by the, against civilians in Ardamta locality, Western Darfur, in November 2023 after they seized the army headquarters. It is worth noting that the eliminations were mainly based on ethnic affiliations, according to the report of YCON which was published on the occasion of '100 days of War' in Sudan. According to it, mass graves were found in Darfur, containing 87 bodies, which led to the opening of an investigation by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The bodies belonged to people, most of whom are Masalit, making it an ethnic murder. Reports indicated that the bodies were buried after the killing of the governor of West Darfur in mid-July 2023. This was repeated in Gezira State, where RSF attacked many villages after invading the state in December 2023, and the attacks led to the killing of many citizens. Sources also reported that SAF physically liquidated about 150 citizens in Gezira state on charges of intelligence with RSF.

9.3.2 Killing by air force and unguided artillery

During a year of war, undirected aerial and artillery bombardment resulted in many deaths, and warplane bombing caused the death of many citizens in the states of Khartoum, Gezira, the states of Darfur, South Kordofan, North Kordofan, and West Kordofan. These include an air strike that took place in July 2023 on a market in El Fasher, North Darfur, which claimed the lives of at least 40 people, and a random bombing in Omdurman in September 2023 that claimed more than 150 civilian casualties, including

children. The massacre was renewed with an air strike on the popular market (Souq Sha'bi) in Omdurman, which claimed the lives of many citizens in November 2023. A number of air strikes were recorded on the cities of Hamrat al-Sheikh (North Kordofan), Zarga (North Darfur), Nyala (South Darfur), and El Daein (East Darfur). In mid-February 2024, an air strike was recorded on Hadara area in Dalami locality in South Kordofan state, killing a number of school children.

9.3.3 Individual eliminations and extrajudicial killings

Many citizens were subjected to killings as a result of suspicion or physical liquidation under the pretext of belonging to one of the war parties. YCON's November 2024 report documented the targeting of those fleeing West Darfur towards the Chadian border by direct shooting. There were also reports of the army's involvement in summarily executing civilians on charges of working with RSF in various areas of Khartoum and Gezira based on their political affiliations.

9.3.4 Kidnapping and forced disappearance

Many cases of kidnapping and forced disappearance were recorded, while monitoring reports during the year recorded the involvement of the Rapid Support Forces in crimes of kidnapping and forced disappearance of a large number of citizens in war zones, sometimes with a demand for ransom to free them, which exposed them to many risks in critical circumstances. Many citizens, especially activists, were subjected to arrests and disappearances by military intelligence.

9.3.5 Forced displacement

Many villages and cities were subjected to cases of forced displacement by the Rapid Support Forces, as entire neighborhoods in West Darfur state and many villages in the Darfur region were displaced. Many citizens also complained, according to monitoring reports throughout the year, of being forced to leave their homes in many neighborhoods in Khartoum like Shajara and Ailafoun. Incidents of assaulting and intimidating citizens have been repeated in Khartoum State. October 6, 2023, witnessed a massive displacement of citizens from Ailfoun area, east of Khartoum, by RSF,

according to what was stated in the October 2023 report, quoting a statement issued by the Emergency Lawyers.

9.3.6 Siege and prevention of the entry of aid

Many cities and areas were subjected to siege and security restrictions, which hindered the entry of humanitarian aid. In the city of Omdurman, the areas of El Fatihab and Bant were subjected to a very long siege that caused great suffering to citizens, as the Rapid Support Forces prevented the exit of citizens and the entry of food supplies into these areas.

9.3.7 Sexual assaults

Many cases of sexual assault were recorded in the regions of Darfur, Khartoum, Gezira and Kordofan. Despite the difficulty of documenting all the cases of sexual violence and rape that occurred during the war, most reports agree that the Rapid Support Forces that entered Khartoum after the start of the war committed rape crimes during the looting and robbery of citizens' homes.

9.3.8 Destruction of property and infrastructure

The war witnessed the destruction of many public facilities, and the exchange of fire and bombing between the RSF and SAF caused the destruction or burning of many buildings and facilities inside and outside Khartoum State, such as: the Ministry of Higher Education, Al Jaili oil refinery, its stores and warehouses, and the Central Bank of Sudan (Gezira Branch), and the Sahel and Sahara Bank tower in Al Mugran area in Khartoum. Citizens' homes were also destroyed by aerial bombardment from the army, as happened in Nyala, South Darfur. The fighting caused widespread destruction of property and infrastructure, including homes, schools, hospitals and agricultural fields. This devastation has severely disrupted livelihoods and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, in addition to targeting bridges and waterways, such as the bombing of Shambat Bridge and the Jabal Awliya Reservoir Bridge. The Kordofan region witnessed the destruction of the Balila oil field.

9.3.9 Sheltering in civilian objects

Since the beginning of the war, the Rapid Support Forces have spread within the city of Khartoum and other cities and occupied many civilian objects, and spread its forces within residential areas, which exposed many citizens to the risk of injury as a result of exchanges of fire, artillery shelling, and air strikes.

9.3.10 Restrictions on freedoms

Restricting freedoms was one of the most important aspects recorded during one year of war on all those who attempted to carry out activities calling for stopping the war. During August 2023, Army intelligence in Blue Nile State arrested young men and women after mass activities in the city of Damazin, before releasing them later. In the state Gezira, the security services broke up a protest in August 2023, and also canceled a symposium that the "No to the Oppression Against Women" initiative was planning to hold in the city of Wad Madani. The authorities arrested groups of young activists demanding an end to the war in the states of Sennar, the North, the White Nile, the Blue Nile, Khartoum, the Nile River, the Greater Kordofan regions, and the states of Darfur. In some cases, the detention continued for weeks under various baseless pretexts. It is noted that arrests take place in areas controlled by both conflict parties. Cases of harassment amounting to arrest were recorded by the Sudanese Armed Forces' intelligence of activists involved in relief and medical support initiatives, under the pretext that they support and assist the Rapid Support Forces, while RSF harass activists in areas under their control and threaten them under the pretext of their support for the old regime.

Citizens in all states suffer from restrictions on their freedoms of movement and expression, and the authorities exploit the Emergency Law to violate human rights and prevent political and civil society organizations from conducting activities or expressing their opinions regarding the current war. In Sennar State, the authorities prevented any political activity in the state, as they prevented the Forces of Freedom and Change FFC from holding a symposium that was scheduled for October 9, 2023, on peaceful coexistence in the Jabal Muya region. The Red Sea authorities in

the east of the country also issued a decision banning meetings, seminars, and all mass activities.

9.3.11 Child recruitment

Many cases of child recruitment were recorded during the war in Sudan. Reports indicate that a large number of children participated in fighting in the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces, most of whom were recruited from the Kordofan regions. Reports also indicated that children as young as 16 years old were recruited to participate in delivering vehicles loaded with stolen goods from Khartoum to El Daein in East Darfur, according to the '200 Days of War' report, while mobilization campaigns in areas controlled by the army show the participation of children among the mobilized.

9.3.12 Failure to provide protection for civilians

Citizens were subjected to many violations by the Rapid Support Forces. Although SAF were sometimes present close to the areas where RSF were deployed, they remained unmoved without attempting to protect civilians, as happened during the first RSF attack on the city of El Geneina in July 2023, then it was repeated in the state of Gezira, where SAF withdrew from the city without informing the citizens, exposing them to great risks.

9.4 The Impact of War on Economic Conditions

Since the outbreak of the April 15 war between SAF and RSF, the Sudanese have been living in very complex living conditions - according to YCON reports - due to its impact on the economy, which has led to a decrease in employment, weak investment, with a stagnation in the purchasing and selling, and a decline in the rate of profits and productivity, and increased inflation, which directly contributed to the inability of citizens to secure a good life. Most regions witnessed a noticeable rise in the prices of consumer goods, with their scarcity and sometimes unavailability in many areas due to the lack of security and the closure of the roads by both warring parties through which commercial movement is active, which led to the cessation of commercial movement on which many

states depend to obtain food supplies. The war changed the lifestyles of citizens and disrupted their activities in all aspects of life, whether agricultural, pastoral, or commercial activities. Citizens also lost their property, while markets were looted. All of this led to the exacerbation of the economic crisis in Sudan and the total collapse of the economy.

Instances of some events that severely affected the Sudanese economy

- ### Kordofan Region

The Kordofan region receives its share of food and supplies from the state of South Sudan and the state of Gezira, which are two main tributaries to the region, but RSF's invasion of the state led to the cessation of the food supply to the states of Kordofan, and this resulted in a rise in the prices of consumer goods. While the trade movement between the region and South Sudan has recovered, this increase is proceeding at a slow pace due to restrictions and the huge sums of money paid by merchants at every checkpoint in South Sudan.

- ### Darfur Region

This region is considered to be one of the turbulent and unstable regions due to the accumulation of the outcomes of armed conflicts with political instability, displacement and asylum, which led to economic deterioration in the region prior to the outbreak of the current war in Sudan, and the situation worsened with the war of April 15 between the SAF and RSF. This caused an increase in the prices of consumer goods and their scarcity in some areas due to the policies followed by RSF that control most of the states of the region. The countries of Chad, South Sudan and Libya are major tributaries that the region depends on in obtaining food supplies that enter from Chad through the state of West Darfur through the localities of Saraf Amra and Umm Dukhun, and from the Chadian locality of El Tineh to the state of El Fasher. Among the most important factors that contributed to the aggravation of the economic situation In the Darfur region:

1. The closure of the road linking Saraf Umra, Zalingei, El Geneina and Kabkabiya by the Rapid Support Forces, which led to a rise in the prices of consumer goods in Central Darfur State and a terrible economic deterioration in Jebel Marra locality.
2. An increase in the exchange rate of the Chadian franc against the Sudanese pound, which led to an increase in the prices of consumer goods coming from Chad.

- **Northern Territory**

The most important economic effects of the war in the North are the decrease of purchasing power in the region as a result of the non-payment of wages to workers, while the weakness of the monetary supply has weakened the Al Dabba market, which feeds the states of Darfur and Kordofan.

- **The Central Region**

The war affected the state of Gezira, especially the commercial movement between it and other states, and led to the loss of investors as a result of insecurity. The lack of fuel in the White Nile contributed to raising transportation tariffs, which increased the prices of consumer goods.

9.5 The impact of War on Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, Losses in Establishments, and its Impact on Food Security (Famine)

9.5.1 Agriculture

Sudan depends for local production on rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, which collapsed rapidly during the war. It caused farmers to be displaced and take refuge in other countries, as well as to change the lifestyle of many farmers and turn them to activities other than agriculture due to the lack of security in agricultural areas and the scarcity and lack of fuel for seasonal agriculture that depend directly on irrigation. In addition to that,

the weak financing of farmers led to their reluctance to farm, the deterioration of agricultural activity, and the decline in the value of the Sudanese pound (inflation).

9.5.2 Industry

The war caused the cessation of more than 80% of commercial establishments, all of which work in the field of medicine and food production, due to their complete or partial destruction or lack of security in their areas, which contributed to the decline in Sudanese exports and, as a result, to an increase in the prices of consumer goods and their absence and the difficulty of obtaining them, which affects food security.

9.5.3 Commerce

The commercial activity in Sudan was affected by the war as a result of the lack of security, the closure of roads linking the states, the imposition of a siege on some areas (such as the RSF's siege of the Dilling locality and the prevention of the entry of supplies and food supplies into it), and the transfer of the centralization of trade in the areas under RSF control in Darfur to the Arab tribes. The war also caused the cessation of border trade points and disruption of supply chains, which led to a decline in export revenues from foreign currency, such as gold, which is one of the most important exports that the state depends on, which contributes to the inflation process and, as a result, affects food security.

9.6 Losses in Sectors

9.6.1 Banking sector

The banking sector in Sudan was damaged to a very large extent in comparison to other sectors, and it was impoverished by the plundering of banks in the states of Darfur, Khartoum, and Gezira, which led to their complete closure and severe shortage of currency in the affected states. Also, the sabotage of the Central Bank of Sudan in Khartoum and its branch in Gezira led to a severe shortage of liquidity and citizens lost the ability

to purchase basic necessities such as food and water, which had a direct impact on food security.

9.6.2 Healthcare Sector

The war has completely damaged the healthcare system in Sudan due to the destruction of hospital infrastructure, their use for military purposes, and the looting of both hospitals and dialysis centers in conflict areas. Additionally, there is a complete lack of medical supplies in safe areas, preventing citizens from receiving necessary healthcare. Hundreds have died from chronic diseases (blood pressure, kidney failure, and diabetes) due to the unavailability of life-saving medications.

This damage has significantly impacted individuals' productivity and weakened their ability to manage their living conditions, directly affecting productive resources (weak or nonexistent local production) and consequently, food security. According to the regional coordinator for the World Health Organization (WHO), the healthcare system in Sudan has been 70% damaged due to the war.

9.6.3 Private Sector

Businessmen and private sector workers have suffered substantial losses in funds and infrastructure due to the war, particularly as clashes continue in Khartoum and other areas without any foreseeable end. This situation has damaged them, disrupted their businesses, and resulted in 80% of workers being laid off without financial compensation, casting a negative shadow over their family lives. This has significantly contributed to the economic decline, which in turn affects food security.

9.6.4 Inflation and Currency Crisis, Transfers, and Banks

Telecommunication networks are crucial for citizens, especially for bank transfers via banking applications, particularly in states where banks have closed. Internet disruptions have hindered financial transfer operations, weakened purchasing power, obstructed communication between traders and goods carriers, and contributed to the rise in prices of consumer goods and their scarcity, making food options limited and inadequate for family needs, exposing them to malnutrition-related illnesses, an indicator of

food insecurity. Several factors associated with the war in Sudan have led to inflation, including:

- The imbalance between foreign currency reserves and the circulating local currency (Sudanese Pound).
- The halt of exports and increase in imports.
- The local currency being counterfeited, significantly disturbing the balance between the dollar reserve and the Sudanese Pound.
- The circulating cash not matching the amount of goods produced.
- Economic activities based on the war effort (war economy).

9.7 The Impact of War on Education in Sudan

The war in Sudan has greatly affected vital institutions, including educational ones, which suffer from various problems and crises, including direct targeting by warring parties, destruction or cessation of operations, or their use as shelters for displaced people fleeing the war or refugees. Because of the social tension and tribal and regional recruitment campaigns, many children have become targets for recruitment, exploiting their poor economic conditions. If the war continues, these problems could have severe consequences, such as weakening children's desire for education and making them hostile and resentful.

Additionally, the war directly affects children's mental health, as they witness excessive violence and feel insecure, leading to crying fits, insomnia, nightmares, and depression. Girls are particularly affected, with many being married off while underage. The rate of children out of school has reached 90%, and the mandate to open schools in some areas without ensuring their security is likely to exacerbate the crisis rather than resolve it.

9.8 Impact of War on Health and Healthcare Facilities

The healthcare system in Sudan has been fragile even before the war due to poor financial support and a shortage of medical staff. The war exacerbated the problems of the healthcare system, especially with the targeting of healthcare facilities and infrastructure, and the targeting and killing of medical staff in hospitals while performing their humanitarian duties.

This led to increased rates of parasitic diseases such as fevers (malaria and dengue) and waterborne diarrheal diseases (cholera), which see an increase in infection rates during the autumn season due to the activity of the causative parasites that thrive in polluted waters and unburied corpses, in addition to poor waste disposal and weak medical prevention measures before autumn.

This situation has led to widespread malnutrition among pregnant women and children. According to Hanan Balkhy, the WHO Regional Director, during her visit to Port Sudan, attacks on healthcare facilities during the war have resulted in more than 25% of all hospitals ceasing operations, while fighters occupy the main national laboratory in Khartoum. WHO reports indicate that 15 million people lack healthcare and that 70% to 80% of healthcare facilities are non-operational due to the current conflict in Sudan. Healthcare facilities in Port Sudan are receiving between two to four times the numbers of patients they used to service. Despite various challenges, the WHO and health sector partners have vaccinated 4.5 million people against cholera in recent months.



Gender-based Violence and its Exploitation in War

A Year Of War in Sudan


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10. Gender-based Violence and its Exploitation in War

Gender-based violence is defined as sexual violence practiced against women or men. In the context of the war in Sudan, gender-based violence was disproportionately higher against women than men. Women were subjected to persecution from all social aspects (underage marriage, female circumcision) alongside being kidnapped and exploited as wives, workers, and commodities for sexual practices and using their bodies to settle scores and break the enemy's morale.

The war has increased the livelihood burdens on women, making them vulnerable to sexual exploitation in exchange for protection, especially in areas exposed to siege or the risk of mass killings due to their limited movement, placing them in front of a fait accompli. Liz Throssell, spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported reliable information from survivors, witnesses, and other sources indicating that more than 20 women and girls have been kidnapped and the number might be higher. Some sources reported seeing women chained on small trucks and cars. She noted that the initial allegations appeared early in the conflict in Khartoum State, which was largely under the control of the RSF, pointing out that at least 105 women have been subjected to sexual violence since the start of the war on April 15, 2023, according to their documentation.

The Joint Human Rights Office in Sudan received reliable reports on November 2, 2023, of more than 50 sexual violence incidents linked to hostilities, affecting at least 105 victims, including 86 women, one man, and 18 children, involving 23 rape cases, 26 gang rapes, and three attempted rapes. The UN official attributed at least 70% of the confirmed sexual violence incidents (37 incidents in total) to men wearing RSF uniforms, eight to armed men affiliated with the RSF, and two incidents to men in unidentified uniforms, with the remaining cases involving unidentified men.



Movement of Displacement and Refuge and the Conditions of the Displaced

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11. Movement of Displacement and Refuge, and the Conditions of the Displaced

11.1 Refugee and Migration Movement

The ongoing war in Sudan has forced citizens to flee the country, enduring exacerbated living conditions and a multitude of problems from lack of shelter to lack of a dignified life, after losing their properties and having their dreams destroyed. Some have sought refuge in neighboring countries, while others have opted for illegal migration to Europe as a better option to search for safety and a decent life after the war extinguished their dreams, destroyed their educational institutions, and lost their homes and livelihoods.

This migration is driven by a fear for their future, risking exploitation by smuggling networks and human trafficking, and drowning while crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, Sudan may lose the young talents it needs for reconstruction and development.

11.2 Displacement Movement

Numbers of displaced people have crowded into shelters and displacement camps in safer states, and the movement of displacement from conflict zones to safer areas continues. Some prefer to return to their homes and face death rather than live in the hell of shelters and displacement camps, which lack the basic necessities of life (water, food, and health).

Since the outbreak of the war, the number of people fleeing their homes inside and outside Sudan has reached 8.2 million. In the past two weeks alone, the number of newly displaced individuals rose to about 107,800 people, including women and children, according to an OCHA report. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network has issued a warning, and catastrophic levels are expected among households in parts of West Darfur and Khartoum, and among the displaced populations in Darfur. Save the Children has warned that approximately 230,000 children, pregnant women, and new mothers could die in the coming months from hunger unless funding and life-saving aid are promptly provided.

The table shows the number of refugee and displacement camps, some shelter centers, the suffering of refugees and displaced people, and their basic and urgent needs according to reports from YCON observers in all states of Sudan

State	Number of Displacement and Refugee Camps	Number of Shelters	Conditions in Displacement Camps and Shelters	Urgent Needs
North Darfur State	(7) large displacement camps. No refugee camps	(129) centers distributed as follows: (91) Within the city of El Fasher (20) centers within the locality of Al Kuma (12) centers within Abu Shouk Camp (3) centers in Al Salam Camp (3) centers in the villages west of El Fasher	Displaced persons are subjected to killings due to shelling by the RSF. There is a severe crisis in medications amidst the spread of malnutrition diseases.	Food supplies, water sources, healthcare, non-food items, medicines, and protection.
South Darfur State	(6) displacement camps One refugee camp (Belil Refugee Camp)	(15) Shelter centers distributed as follows: (4) shelter centers in Nyala locality (9) shelter centers in Tulus locality (2) shelter centers in Belil locality	Displaced persons suffer from a severe lack of food and medicine, and the absence of security, which has contributed to a rise in unemployment levels among the displaced and the spread of malnutrition diseases.	Food supplies, healthcare, providing water sources, providing medicines, non-food items, and children's vaccinations.
Central Darfur State	(5) large displacement camps One refugee camp in Um Shalaya locality	(78) Shelter centers in Zalingei locality (4) centers in Wadi Salih locality (3) centers in the Dalig unit of Wadi Salih locality	Displaced persons suffer from a lack of food supplies, drinking water, non-food items, and women's necessities. They also suffer from violations by the RSF, including the arrest of traders and sheikhs with ransom demands for their release.	Food supplies, healthcare, providing water sources, providing medicines, non-food items, and children's vaccinations.
Northern State	None	Total number of shelter centers: (126) centers Merowe locality: (25) centers Dongola locality: (17) centers Barqiq locality: (9) centers Dabba locality: (19) centers Qold locality: (3) centers Daglo locality: two centers Halfa locality: (51) centers	The situation is improving due to an abundance of food supplies provided by charitable and active community members, although there is a shortage of medicine and rising prices.	Providing medicines and non-food items.

State	Number of Displacement and Refugee Camps	Number of Shelters	Conditions in Displacement Camps and Shelters	Urgent Needs
South Kordofan State	None	Total number of shelter centers: (25) centers (10) centers in the Eastern Rural locality (15) centers in the Al Qoz locality	Displaced persons suffer from high prices of consumer goods, with a lack of food and healthcare.	Providing medicines and non-food items.
North Kordofan State	None	(290) shelter centers	Displaced persons live in highly complex humanitarian conditions, suffering from a lack of water, food, and healthcare.	Food supplies, non-food items, water sources, women's necessities, and medicines.
West Kordofan State	None	Total number of shelter centers: (72) centers (6) centers in Al Mujlad (20) centers in Al Fula (8) centers in Babanusa (6) in Baqaa (13) centers in Al Nahud (5) centers in Al Miram (8) centers in Abu Zaid (10) centers in Al Sunut	There is a shortage of food, medicines, and women's necessities.	Providing food and non-food items, and providing medicines, especially for chronic diseases
Gadaref State	(5) refugee camps	Total number of shelter centers: (107) centers (49) centers in Qadarif municipality (58) centers in Al Qabliyat locality	Shortage of food Shortage of medicines Women's necessities	Providing food supplies. Providing non-food items. Providing medicines for chronic diseases.
White Nile State	(12) camps	(360) shelters distributed across various localities.	Shortage of food Shortage of medicines Women's necessities	Providing food supplies. Providing non-food items. Providing medicines for chronic diseases. Providing vaccines for children.
Gezira State	None	Total (87) shelters. (7) shelters in Al Hasahisa locality, (9) in Al Qurashi 24 locality, (9) in the South Gezira locality, (35) in Al Gezira Al Kubra locality, (27) in the East Gezira locality	Shortage of food Shortage of medicines Women's necessities	Providing food supplies. Providing non-food items. Providing medicines for chronic diseases. Providing vaccines for children.



The International Response to the Humanitarian Crisis

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12. The International Response to the Humanitarian Crisis

The international community has not dealt with the humanitarian crisis in Sudan to the extent it has with crises in other countries, due to its lack of recognition and failure to fulfill its responsibilities. The Red Cross has left Sudan, abdicating its responsibilities even though it operates in emergency conditions.

Although the international community could compel both parties of the conflict to allow the entry of humanitarian aid, it does not press strongly for this, especially since the international community could exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which significantly influence the conflict. There are obstacles within the Sudanese context that prevent the international community from providing the necessary humanitarian aid to avert the food crisis in Sudan, including:

- The failure of civil society organizations to highlight the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
- A lack of awareness of human rights law by both war parties, and their disregard for international conventions concerning the entry of humanitarian aid, demonstrated by targeting international organization staff.
- A lack of trust between the conflict parties.
- The politicization of humanitarian aid, as both sides of the conflict use the issue of humanitarian aid to serve their military objectives.



Challenges

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13. Challenges

One of the main challenges in addressing the conflict in Sudan is the absence of a unified approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Efforts to mediate and negotiate for a peaceful resolution have been hindered by deeply rooted grievances and a lack of trust among the concerned parties.

The absence or weak impact of civil action is one of the most important factors affecting the peace process, as there is no significant pressure on the war parties to stop the war. Civil division and party conflicts are among the main causes of weak civil action, in addition to security restrictions on political activity within Sudan.

The humanitarian response has faced severe pressures, and the limited resources and difficulty in accessing affected populations pose a significant challenge, especially as both sides of the war use the issue of humanitarian aid to serve their military objectives. Moreover, the weak international response to humanitarian needs has impacted the ability of organizations to provide necessary support.



Conclusion

YOUTH CITIZENS OBSERVERS NETWORK

14. Conclusion

This report discussed the main events resulted due to the ongoing war in Sudan, and as Sudan continues to struggle with the effects of a year of conflict, the path to peace and stability remains long and unpaved. More efforts from stakeholders, both domestically and internationally, are required to address the root causes of the conflict, enhance reconciliation, and rebuild torn communities. It is essential that the voices of the affected people are heard, and their rights protected in the efforts to resolve the conflict.



General Recommendations

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15. General Recommendations

- Exert pressure on both sides of the conflict -- through political bodies, civil society organizations, and the international community -- to stop the war and restore the path to democratic transition.
- Press the warring parties for an immediate halt to all human rights violations against civilians, and to prioritize participation in peaceful negotiations in order to seek a political solution to the ongoing conflict.
- Conduct comprehensive investigations into human rights violations and hold perpetrators accountable in all states of Sudan.
- Hold accountable the countries proven to be involved in supporting either side of the conflict in Sudan.
- Secure routes between states and allow the entry of humanitarian aid and medical services, especially in states affected by the war, to help provide necessary support to those affected by the conflict.
- Pressure international organizations and UN agencies to increase the amount of humanitarian aid, which has been insufficient compared to the number of eligible recipients so far.
- Provide a radical solution to the problem of unpaid employee wages. The state can offer a financial package or work to improve living conditions to reduce economic pressure on families.
- Raise awareness to reduce tribal polarization in the current war so that it does not lead to a potential civil war in the near future.
- Support and encourage initiatives for reconciliation and conflict resolution based on the community. These initiatives can help promote understanding and cooperation among diverse communities.
- Encourage relevant entities to provide psychological and social support to those affected by the war and implement recreational programs to help them overcome the effects of the conflict.



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